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HEWITT V. HEWITT

CONTRACT COHABITATION
AND "EQUITABLE EXPECTATIONS"
RELIEF FOR MERETRICIOUS
SPOUSES
Well-documented statistics indicate the prevalence of the
meretricious relationship' as a developing alternative to tradi2
tional marriage. Recent studies on non-marital cohabitation
3
place the number of meretricious spouses in excess of 1.3 million persons, a sixteen fold increase since 1960.4 Whatever the
reasons effectuating this novel development, 5 judicial recognition of current cohabitation preferences has lagged behind social acknowledgment and partial acceptance.
The lack of litigation between unmarrieds has delayed judicial development of the law regarding meretricious claims. This
retardation stems from the obvious fact that, absent statutorily
or judicially recognized bonds between the parties, court assistance was unnecessary to dissolve their relationship. Only recently have the courts been confronted with an actual numerical
1. Various terms including "contract marriage," "de facto marriage,"
"trial marriage," "domestic partnership," and "meretricious relationship"
have been used to describe the relation between unmarried cohabitants.
An exhaustive vocabulary can be found in Folberg and Buren, Domestic
Partnership:A ProposalFor Dividing The Propertyof Unmarried Families,
12 WILLAMEITE L.J. 453 n.2 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Folberg and Buren].
2. Cohabitation contemplates more than a single occasion of intimacy,
as the term generally connotes that the parties have set up housekeeping
with a certain degree of permanence.
3. As used in this note, a meretricious spouse is one who in cohabiting
with another knows that the relationship does not constitute a marriage.
Carlson v. Olson, 256 N.W.2d 249, 252 n.2 (Minn. 1977). A putative spouse is
one who, following a marriage ceremony, cohabits with another who is not
his spouse because of a marital defect, in the good faith belief that he is
married to that person. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, § 305 (1977).
4. NEWSWEEK, Aug. 1, 1977, at 46.
5. The loss of pension and welfare rights through marriage, other prejudicial statutorily based taxes and disbursements by government entities,
and personal opinions on marital inflexibility and finalness are the most
often mentioned explanations for the increase in non-marital cohabitation.
See generally Foster, Marriageand Divorce in the Twilight Zone, 17 ARiz. L.
REV. 462 (1975); Milgrim, Marriage Contracts For Support and Services:
ConstitutionalityBegins At Home, 49 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1161 (1974); Richards,
DiscriminationAgainst Married Couples Under Present Income Tax Laws,
49 TAXES 526 (1971); Weitzman, Legal Regulation of Marriage: Tradition
and Change, 62 CALIF. L. REV. 1169 (1974).
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expansion in assertions by meretricious spouses. 6 The courts,
however, not being blessed with a developed body of applicable
rules, generally have left plaintiffs remediless or have been
forced to resort to legal fiction and fabrication in order to arrive
at just and equitable results.7 Indeed, reliance on court creations has underlied much of the law of non-statutory marital
relationships.
Early statutes establishing the requisites for a valid marriage often were devoid of express declarations nullifying marriages contracted without observance of legislative formalities. 8
Based on the assumption that the failure to proscribe non-statutory marriages was indicative of recognition of other possible
marriages, 9 the court-created doctrine of common law marriage1 0 developed in Illinois" and elsewhere. 12 The declared
state policy that marriages should be before witnesses led to the
close judicial scrutinization of non-statutory marriages. 1 3 Later,
when this policy was coupled with growing abuse of the common law doctrine, the combination was sufficient to force its legislative abrogation. 14 While about one-third of the states
recognize such marriages,15 all common law marriages entered
into after 1905 are null and void in Illinois. 16 It has been noticed,
however, that while legislative extinguishment of the doctrine
may have been well-founded, the practice of alternatives to stat6. This recent though deliberate expansion is evidenced by the late decision dates of most meretricious cases and the complete absence of author-

ity in many states. See Annot., 31 A.L.R.2d 1255 (1953 & Supp. 1978).
Meretricious claims have generally fallen into two classifications: (1) suits
against decedents' estates to enforce contract provisions to name a
cohabitor in a will, and (2) suits requesting property division and support.
7. Compare Rehak v. Mathis, 239 Ga. 541, 238 S.E.2d 81 (1977) (left
plaintiff remediless despite eighteen year cohabitation) with Carlson v. Olson, 256 N.W.2d 249 (Minn. 1977) (fabrication of implied irrevocable gift
remedy) and Omer v. Omer, 11 Wash. App. 386, 523 P.2d 957 (1974) (fictionbased constructive trust employed).
8. Port v. Port, 70 Ill. 484, 486 (1873).
9. Id. at 487.
10. Common law marriages are those entered into without solemnization or ceremony. They are given legal effect if two prerequisites are met:
(1) an agreement to enter into a matrimonial relation through mutual assumption of marital duties, and (2) cohabitation after the agreement. See
McKenna v. McKenna, 180 Ill. 577, 54 N.E. 641 (1898).
11. Heblethwaite v. Hepworth, 98 Ill. 126 (1880), found both of the common law marriage elements present. The Port case set forth the basis for
the development of the common law marriage, however, the court held that
both prerequisites had not been met.
12. See, e.g., Billig and Lynch, Common Law Marriagein Minnesota: A
Problem in Social Security, 22 MINN. L. REV. 177, 179 (1938).
13. See Pike v. Pike, 112 Ill. App. 243 (1904).
14. See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 89, § 4 (Smith-Hurd 1972).
15. H. KRAUSE, FAMmY LAw 59 (1976).
16. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, § 214 (1977).
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utory matrimony was not eliminated.1 7 Instead only the rules,
rights, and remedies applicable to such relationships were abolished.
This void in rights and remedies was never judicially filled
in Illinois. Following the public policy based common law rule
holding illegal agreements promotive of immorality, 18 Illinois
courts, as well as those in sister states, refused to lend their aid
where the parties had contemplated non-marital sexual intercourse as any part of an agreement's consideration. 19 In the absence of an express or implied agreement, 20 quasi-contractual
theories were pleaded in attempts to recover the reasonable
value of services rendered within the relationship. 2' Such
claims in quantum meruit 22 met with judicial resistance and dis23
allowance of recovery.
This judicial hands-off policy slowly began to give way to
considerations of justice and equity in other states. The result
was that while neither party to a meretricious relation acquired
rights by cohabitation alone,24 the fact that the parties lived together without marriage did not render all agreements between
them unenforceable. 25 With the trend of the judiciary having
17. Carlson v. Olson, 256 N.W.2d 249, 251 (Minn. 1977).
18. 6A A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1476 (1962);
CONTRACTS § 859 (1932).

RESTATEMENT OF

19. E.g., Hill v. Estate of Westbrook, 95 Cal. App. 2d 599, 213 P.2d 727
(1950) (woman's suit to enforce agreement to name her in will); Drennan v.
Douglas, 102 Ill. 341 (1882) (agreement to provide for meretricious spouse in
will); Vetten v. Wallace, 39 Ill. App. 390 (1890) (agreement of support between meretricious spouses); but see Hagen v. MacVeagh, 288 Ill. App. 1, 5
N.E.2d 577 (1936) (illicit relations did not invalidate agreement by man to
support woman, the court severing valid consideration of woman's
forbearance to sue on a breach of promise to marry claim).
20. While express contracts arise when the parties make an express
agreement, written or oral, implied contracts arise in the absence of express
agreement, where the conduct of the parties clearly indicates an intent to
contract. 1 A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 18 (1962).
21. Quasi-contracts are court created legal fictions used to imply absent
contractual intent or assent for the purpose of achieving equitable results,
namely the prevention of unjust enrichment. People v. Porter, 287 Ill. 401,
403, 123 N.E. 59, 60 (1919).
22. Quantum meruit is a form of action commonly called quasi-contractual recovery for the value of services rendered. See BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1408 (revised 4th ed. 1968).
23. In re Estate of Thompson, 337 Ill. App. 290, 85 N.E.2d 840 (1949) (dictum hinting that recovery could have been had if an express contract had
been proved).
Illegality and severability of consideration discussions might be irrelevant in suits in quasi-contract. See Folberg and Buren, supra note 1, at 466.
24. See Stevens v. Anderson, 75 Ariz. 331, 256 P.2d 712 (1953).
25. Tyranski v. Piggins, 44 Mich. App. 570, 205 N.W.2d 595 (1973) (enforced oral agreement to convey property because of independent consideration in the form of services); accord, Latham v. Latham, 274 Or. 421, 547
P.2d 144 (1976); contra, Rehak v. Mathis, 239 Ga. 541, 238 S.E.2d 81 (1977)
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moved toward increased tolerance of marriage alternatives, the
California Supreme Court decision in Marvin v. Marvin26 indicated the extent to which the judicial restructuring of non-marital family law had evolved.
During the past two years, debate has raged concerning the
meaning, propriety, and implications of Marvin's pro-meretricious decision. Only a few courts of review have been confronted with post-Marvin meretricious claims. 27 The extensive
work of commentators, however, have made up for the lack of
reported appellate litigation. 28 This debate penetrated the Illinois appellate court system for the first time in Hewitt v.
Hewitt,29 bringing with it divergent views on judicial, equitable,
social, moral, and public policy considerations.
In Hewitt, counsel framed issues dealing expressly with the
factual situation before the court. 30 However, all parties realized that the ultimate question presented for review was
whether Marvin, with its attendant liberal moral basis and still
undetermined limits and implications, should be incorporated
(admitted non-marital cohabitation prevented court enforcement of agreement).
26. 18 Cal. 3d 660, 557 P.2d 106, 134 Cal. Rptr. 815 (1976).
27. Vogel v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 450 F. Supp. 224 (S.D.N.Y.
1978) (applying California law but distinguishing Marvin in not allowing
meretricious spouse a statutory cause of action to sue for wrongful death of
former cohabitant); Rehak v. Mathis, 239 Ga. 541, 238 S.E.2d 81 (1977) (ignoring Marvin in denying relief in case with comparable facts); Carlson v. Olson, 256 N.W.2d 249 (Minn. 1977) (approving Marvin); Warren v. Warren,
579 P.2d 772 (Nev. 1978) (citing Marvin without expressing approval or disapproval and affirming denial of relief for failure to prove pooling of resources or partnership agreement, rather than on public policy grounds);
Beal v. Beal, 282 Or. 115, 577 P.2d 507 (1978) (approving Marvin in part);
Edgar v. Wagner, 572 P.2d 405 (Utah 1977) (without citation to Marvin,
award affirmed on contract and gift theories despite appellant's public policy contentions); Hinkle v. McColm, 89 Wash. 2d 769, 575 P.2d 711 (1978) (citing Marvin but not ready to adopt it in toto).
28. See, e.g., Mitchelson and Glucksman, Equal Protection For Unmarried Cohabitors."An Insider'sLook at Marvin v. Marvin, 5 PEPPERDINE L.
REV. 283 (1978) (criticizing case for not delving into constitutional issue
raised by co-author as counsel for appellant in Marvin); Comment, Practitioner's Guide To The Wages of Sin, 52 LA. B.J. 502 (1977) (criticizing
Marvin); Comment, Nonmarital Relationships: A Fair Termination Is
Possible, 24 Loy. L. REV. 128 (1978) (approving of Marvin in part); 90 HARV.
L. REV. 1708 (1977); 30 OKLA. L. REV. 494 (1977); 23 WAYNE L. REV. 1305
(1977). For an excellent California historical perspective, reference should
be made to Kay and Anyx, Marvin v. Marvin: Preserving The Options, 65
CALIF. L. REV. 937 (1977).
29. 62 Ill. App. 3d 861, 380 N.E.2d 454 (1978).
30. Whether persons living in a non-marital relationship, by some
agreement, express or implied, over long periods of time, holding each other
out as husband and wife, are deprived of court protection by virtue of their
non-marital cohabitation? Reply Brief for Appellant at 2, Hewitt v. Hewitt,
62 111. App. 3d 861, 380 N.E.2d 454 (1978).
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into Illinois law in toto, rejected outright, or dealt with cautiously, step-by-step.
The significance of Hewitt extends well beyond its distinction as a case of first impression in Illinois. Notice is served of
the evolution of the meretricious relationship into a judicially
recognized living arrangement. The actual shortcomings of
traditional marriage are pointed out by dispelling arguments
that non-marital cohabitation and the financial fruits thereof are
the causes of the institution's seeming breakdown. Hewitt also
raises doubts as to the propriety of the legislative refusal to deal
with meretricious rights in the recent overhaul of Illinois' domestic relations law, especially with the well-publicized Marvin
31
opinion having been handed down during its deliberations.
The Hewitt decision will probably send lawmakers, who failed
to anticipate the future, back to the drafting table for the promulgation of legislation, explaining, approving, or more than
likely usurping Hewitt's holding.
RECENT SISTER STATE MERETRICIOUS DEVELOPMENTS

Due to the wide publicity afforded the Marvin decision,32
the holding was understood by many to be the first of its kind.
California, however, had itself enunciated pre-Marvin pro-meretricious decisions. Marvin's importance stems from its synthesis of meretricious remedies, previously employed individually,
in an attempt to catalogue the extensive array of possibilities.
In Marvin,33 the California Supreme Court was confronted
31. Illinois revised its domestic relations law effective October 1, 1977.

This revision, which included adoption of a new marriage and marriage dis-

solution act, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, §§ 101 et seq. (1977), was approved Sept.
22, 1977. Marvin was decided Dec. 27, 1976. See generally Auerbach, Introduction To The New Illinois Marriageand Dissolution of MarriageAct, 66
ILL. B.J. 132 (1977); Heyman, The Illinois Marriageand Dissolution of Marriage Act: New Solutions to Old Problems, 12 J. MAR. J. 1 (1978); Kalcheim,
MaritalProperty,Tax Ramifications,and Maintenance: Practice Under The
Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of MarriageAct: A Comparative Study,
66 ILL. B.J. 324 (1978).
32. Defendant Lee Marvin and plaintiff Michelle Marvin are motion picture and stage performers. The amount in dispute exceeded one million
dollars in motion picture rights.
33. The former Michelle Triola, having legally changed her surname to
that of the defendant, prayed for a declaratory judgment of her contract and
property rights and for the creation of a constructive trust on one-half of the
property held in defendant's name. Paramount among her allegations was
the claim that the parties seven year cohabitation had been based on an

express oral agreement providing for an equal sharing in property acquisitions and a guarantee of support by defendant for plaintiffs life. Plaintiff
performed her part of the agreement by foregoing her career as an entertainer so as to perform her duties as a homemaker and companion. Suit
was filed when the defendant forced plaintiff from his home and terminated
support payments. The trial court dismissed the case on the pleadings and
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with conflicting precedents4 and confusing anomalies existing
in its own non-marital family law. 35 In holding that plaintiff had
stated a cause of action in express contract, prior unworkable
tests were replaced. The more liberal standard set forth, perceiving that cohabitation without marriage should not in itself
invalidate non-marital agreements, provided for enforcement of
such agreements except where they were expressly and in36
separably based on the consideration of sexual services.
Marvin rejected the theory that the property of unmarried
cohabitors was to be divided according to community property
principles applicable to legal and putative spouses. 37 This was
justified on the ground that meretricious spouses could not have
expectations based on the belief that they were married. The
court, however, did recognize the need for judicial intervention
in order to ascertain the parties' reasonable expectations from
their relationship. 38 The court, therefore, allowed plaintiff to
amend her complaint to state a cause of action in implied contract, and in dicta espoused the view that other equitable remerefused leave to amend to state a cause of action in implied contract. An
intermediate appellate court opinion of affirmance was withdrawn without
being officially published. Excerpts of this opinion can be found in recent
family law texts. See, e.g., H. KRAUSE, FAMILY LAw 109 (1976).
34. The court was confronted with competing lines of authority on
whether illicit relations, in the form of non-marital cohabitation, rendered
express agreements between such cohabitors unenforceable as against
public policy. Compare Trutalli v. Meraviglia, 215 Cal. 698, 12 P.2d 430 (1932)
(fact that parties were living in immoral relation did not disqualify them
from contracting to the extent that such illicit relations were not made a
consideration for the agreement, the court severing the valid provisions and
enforcing them) with Heaps v. Toy, 54 Cal. App. 2d 178, 128 P.2d 813 (1942)
(agreement held contrary to good morals and unenforceable because of presumed unlawful relations).
35. Marvin v. Marvin, 18 Cal. 3d 660, 669-73, 557 P.2d 106, 112-14, 134 Cal.
Rptr. 815, 821-23 (1976). Among anomalies noted in interpreting California
case law, was the fact that while express contract claims had been upheld at
certain times, recovery on equally well established common law implied
contract had been denied. At this time, domestic services were presumed
to have been rendered gratuitously, leaving only inputs of property and
funds as apportionable items in any relationship. Putative spouses derived
rights on equitable and other theories, not available to meretricious
spouses, namely in implied partnership and quantum meruit. Some courts,
however, interpreted that community property principles of the Family Law
Act, CAL. CrV. CODE §§ 4000 et seq. (1970), applied to meretricious spouses.
See, e.g., In re Cary, 34 Cal. App. 3d 345,109 Cal. Rptr. 862 (1973) (the theory
was that with fault concepts drastically eliminated from the divorce statutes, the presumed fault of immoral sexual intercourse of meretricious
spouses should not prevent the statutory principles from applying to them
to the same extent as to otherwise "guilty" legal spouses).
36. Marvin v. Marvin, 18 Cal. 3d 660, 672, 557 P.2d 106, 114, 134 Cal. Rptr.
815, 823 (1976).
37. Id. at 682, 557 P.2d at 121, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 830.
38. Id. at 684, 557 P.2d at 122, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 831.
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39
Among
dies could be employed in non-marital cases.
interpretations and reversals of existing law needed to achieve
this broad decision, homemaking services were held to be valid
and adequate contract consideration. 40 The presumption that
domestic services were rendered gratuitously was replaced by a
presumption that unmarrieds intended to deal fairly with one
41
another.

Marvin, without delving into historical origins or underlying
theories, enumerated the various bases for relief by citing sister
state cases utilizing them. The remedies available in certain
states include relief arising from an implied agreement of joint
venture or partnership 42 or relief upon a resulting trust. 43 Remedies not based on intent have also been employed. These include constructive trust impressions 44 and quantum meruit
39. A single dissent chastized the majority's venture into equitable remedies, believing it to be unnecessary for the disposition of the case. Id. at
686, 557 P.2d at 123, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 832 (Clark, J., concurring and dissenting).
40. Id. at 670, 557 P.2d at 113, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 823.
41. Id. at 683, 557 P.2d at 121, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 830.
42. The implied partnership or joint venture theory is transformed into
a meretricious remedy by applying rules regarding partnership dissolution
to the case where one party has died or the relationship has been otherwise
terminated. See Estate of Thompson, 81 Wash. 2d 72, 499 P.2d 864 (1972). In
Thompson, the court ruled that the plaintiff had a valid claim against her
former cohabitant's estate, based on an implied-in-fact partnership shown
by the circumstances. The paramount requisite of a partnership, the sharing of business profits, was shown by the parties' joint operation of a cattle
raising business for profit, during seventeen years of cohabitation.
43. Where consideration is advanced to a third person by a grantor, the
property is taken in the name of the grantee, and the grantor and grantee
are strangers in that they are not married. Therefore, a resulting trust
arises in the grantee to hold title subject to the equitable interests of the
grantor. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS §§ 440 et seq. (1965). See Hyman v. Hyman, 275 S.W.2d 149 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954) (meretricious spouse
held entitled to property, on resulting trust theory, upon showing that
purchase was made with funds acquired in whole or in part through her
labors). But cf. Sugg v. Morris, 392 P.2d 313 (Alaska 1964) (recognizing resulting trust, but reversing on ground that woman failed to prove precise
amount of her contribution).
44. Constructive trusts are equitable remedies that arise independent
of any actual or presumed intent of the parties, and often operate to frustrate intention. This remedy arises when a party, holding title to property,
is subject to an equitable duty to convey it to another, on the ground that
retention would unjustly enrich the holder. When title has been acquired
fraudulently or unconscionably, equity converts the holder into a trustee
for another's benefit. The beneficiary can pray for the subsequent transfer
of title or the forced sale and payover of the profits thereof. See generally
RESTATEMENT OF RESTrrUTION §§ 160 et seq. (1937); G. BOGERT and G. BoGERT, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw OF TRUSTS § 77 (5th ed. 1973). This remedy
has been judicially employed in meretricious cases. See, e.g., Omer v.
Omer, 11 Wash. App. 386, 523 P.2d 957 (1974). In Omer, constructive fraud or
unconscionability was sufficient reason to impose a constructive trust upon
a man, who directed his own marriage dissolution for citizenship purposes,
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fictions. 45 An implied irrevocable gift theory has also found
favor in one jurisdiction. 46 Other theories have been advanced
by commentators and not yet accepted or rejected. 47 The common thread underlying each of these remedial devices appears
to be the realization that parties to non-marital relationships
enter or remain involved because of personal expectations of future benefits. However, this thread was not picked up by the
Hewitt trial court.
FACTS AND THE ORDER OF THE TRIAL COURT

Mrs. Hewitt's amended complaint 48 prayed for the court to
award her a fair portion of the property and earnings of the defendant, to compel him to make support payments to plaintiff
and the couple's minor children, 4 9 or alternatively, to divide the
though he continued to cohabit with his former wife. During this period,
the woman followed the man's advice and worked to acquire property for
their future joint benefit upon their previously planned remarriage. Title to
the property was held severally by the man, however, and upon the woman's suit, the man was converted into a constructive trustee for her benefit.
45. Quantum meruit arises by operation of law, in that legal fiction is
used to impose quasi-contractual liability in the absence of assent or even
in the presence of express dissent. While constructive trusts deal with the
prevention of unjust enrichment in property acquisitions, quantum meruit
is concerned with the unjust enrichment of one who has been benefited by
services received from one who rendered them with the expectation of
monetary return. Since the unjust enrichment of the recipient is the basis
for quantum meruit recovery, the amount to be paid is often the reasonable
value of the services to the recipient. See, e.g., Olwell v. Nye and Nissen
Co., 26 Wash. 2d 282, 173 P.2d 652 (1946). Since homemaking services are
within Marvin's contemplation of this remedy, a woman's recovery could be
the amount that the man would have to pay a housekeeper, not necessarily
the same value the work would be worth to her. See generally Brunch,
Property Rights of De Facto Spouses Including Thoughts on the Value of the
Homemaker's Service, 10 FAM. L. Q. 101 (1976).
46. See Carlson v. Olson, 256 N.W.2d 249 (Minn. 1977). In Carlson, 21
years of cohabitation ended with the woman suing for partition and the man
claiming that, with the exception of a sum received from the woman's parents, all family funds had been supplied through his efforts. Citing Marvin
for its position on the availability of equitable remedies in meretricious situations, the court partitioned the property one-half to each party. The
justification for this result was that an implied irrevocable gift had occurred
between the parties.
47. See Folberg and Buren, supra note 1, at 474 (non-business partnership based solely on domestic cohabitation and equitable lien theories of
recovery).
48. Plaintiff's original pleading had been a complaint for divorce, alleging fifteen years of cohabitation subsequent to a 1960 marriage in Iowa. On
defendant's motion, the complaint was dismissed, when plaintiff conceded
that there had been no statutory or common law marriage which the court
could recognize.
49. Defendant admitted paternity, making a separate action on the child
support issue unnecessary. See generally ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 106 3/4, § 51 et
seq. (1977).
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parties' joint tenancy holdings and impress a constructive trust
on the jointly accumulated property held severally by the defendant. The trial court, compelled to take the well-pleaded
50
facts as true in deciding on a defendant's motion to dismiss,
dealt only with the plaintiff's version of the parties' domestic relationship.
Prior to June of 1960, the parties were Illinois residents attending an Iowa college. When the plaintiff became pregnant,
the defendant told her they were husband and wife, that no marriage ceremony was needed, and that he would share his life,
earnings, and property with the plaintiff. The parties subsequently held themselves out as husband and wife. During
fifteen years of cohabitation, Mrs. Hewitt devoted her efforts to
assisting the defendant in obtaining his professional education
51
and the establishment of his now lucrative dentistry practice.
Though plaintiff received paychecks for assisting in the office,
these monies were used for family purposes. This financial input was also supplemented by plaintiff's services as homemaker
and mother.
The trial court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a
cause of action cognizable under Illinois contract or partnership
law, noting that the state required all such claims for property
a valid marriage, which was absent from
division be based on
5 2
the facts pleaded.
THE OPINION OF THE APPELLATE COURT

On appeal, Mrs. Hewitt argued that the trial court had erred
in dismissing her complaint, advancing contentions similar to
those espoused in favor of the Marvin appellant. 53 Justice
Trapp reversed the trial court judgment and remanded the case,
concluding that the appellant had neither participated in a meretricious relationship nor conducted herself in such a manner
50. See, e.g., Acorn Driving School v. Bd. of Educ. of Leyden High
School Dist. No. 212, 27 Ill. 2d 93, 187 N.E.2d 722 (1963).

51. Defendant practiced pedodontia, a branch of dentistry concerned
with children. It was also alleged that plaintiff's mother and father, himself
a dentist, financially assisted defendant's educational advancement.
52. 62 Ill. App. 3d at 863, 380 N.E.2d at 456 (1978).
53. Appellant argued for an adoption of Marvin's holding that an agree-

ment between unmarried cohabitants should be enforced, absent a finding
that its basis was the consideration of purely sexual services. She said that
such circumstances were not shown by the pleaded facts, which the court
was forced to assume were true. She also claimed that the power of equity,
to prevent the unjust enrichment of Mr. Hewitt, at her expense, was not
limited by the conceded absence of a legal marriage. Brief for Appellant at
6, Hewitt v. Hewitt, 62 Ill. App. 3d 861, 380 N.E.2d 454 (1978).
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that precluded relief.54 In deciding that appellant had not participated in a meretricious relationship, the court looked to the
precise dictionary definition of the terms meretricious and
concubine, and concluded that the pleaded facts, showing the
conventional, respectable, and ordinaryfamily lifestyle of these
unmarried parties, prevented reference to Mrs. Hewitt as even
55
remotely related to a prostitute.
Mr. Hewitt argued that appellant's claim should be defeated
on the public policy restriction that such quasi-divorce property
rights do not attach, absent a valid marriage contract. 56 The
court's inquiry regarding this contention was centered in three
areas: the new Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage
Act, 57 the criminal statutes dealing with illicit relations, 58 and
the Marvin decision. The court impliedly denied that the new
Marriage Act restricted the granting of contract and property
rights to married couples only. While realizing that the underlying purposes of the Act is to strengthen and preserve the integrity of marriage and to safeguard family relationships, 59 it
noticed that no provision of the Act undertook to prohibit cohabitation without marriage. 60 The court, however, apparently
struggling with appellee's contentions, 61 was compelled to conclude that appellant had "for more than fifteen years lived
within the legitimate boundariesof a marriage and family rela62
tionship of a most conventional sort."
Investigation shifted to the criminal statutes and the offense
of fornication was scrutinized. 63 It was obvious to the court that
all illicit cohabitation is not proscribed in Illinois. In attempting
to ascertain the extent of criminal sanctions over non-marital co54.
55.
56.
N.E.2d

62 111. App. 3d at 869, 380 N.E.2d at 460 (1978).
Id. at 863, 380 N.E.2d at 456 (emphasis added).
Brief for Appellee at 2, Hewitt v. Hewitt, 62 Ill. App. 3d 861, 380
454 (1978).
57. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, §§ 101 et seq. (1977).
58. Id. ch. 38, §§ 11-7, 8.

59. Id. ch. 40, § 102.
60. The court also observed that the Hewitt's relationship did not
amount to a statutorily prohibited marriage. See generally id. § 212.

61. Mr. Hewitt's argument was not that non-marital cohabitation was
prohibited by the act, but rather that the legislature's refusal to provide for
dissolution relief upon termination of non-marital cohabitation indicated
the state's choice not to recognize non-statutory relationships, like that of
the Hewitts. Brief for Appellee at 4, Hewitt v. Hewitt, 62 Ill. App. 3d 861, 380
N.E.2d 454 (1978).
62. Id. at 864, 380 N.E.2d at 457 (1978) (emphasis added).
63. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 11-8(a) provides "[a]ny person who cohabits
or has sexual intercourse with another not his spouse commits fornication
if the behavior is open and notorious." The court realized that the adultery
provisions were inapplicable because neither party had a living legal
spouse.
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habitation, attention was focused on the "open and notorious"
language. After a reference to a recent case delimiting the
not to be sugbreadth of this phrase, the pleaded facts were held
64
gestive of an offense transgressing public policy.
The court's third inquiry resulted from appellant's request
of Marvin to this case. In light of the absence of
application
for
Illinois authority 65 and the comparability of the factual situations, 66 the Hewitt court took liberty to quote extensively from
Marvin. The principles extracted from Marvin's express contract and public policy holding suggest that "[tIhe fact that a
man and woman live together without marriage and engage in a
sexual relationship, does not in itself invalidate agreements between them relating to their earnings, property, or expenses"
and that no public policy precludes enforcement of such agreements, at least where they do not rest on the inseparable consideration of meretricious sexual services. 67 Appellee's public
64. In People v. Cessna, 42 Ill. App. 3d 746, 356 N.E.2d 621 (1976), defendant's adultery conviction was reversed, based on the fact that knowledge of
the illicit intercourse did not extend publicly beyond the family of his alleged paramour. Relying heavily on language espousing the view that notoriety of adultery, like the possible fornication in the facts before them, had
to extend beyond the cohabitation or intercourse, to the fact of the absence
of a marital relation, the Hewitt court recognized no crime had been committed in its factual situation. The absence of a valid marriage between the
Hewitts had first been publicly disclosed by appellee's 1975 motion to dismiss the original divorce complaint. See 62 Ill. App. 3d at 865, 380 N.E.2d at
458 (1978).
65. While the parties were in agreement that this was a case of first impression in Illinois, each placed differing significance on the absence of
prior case law. Mrs. Hewitt merely implored the court to extend Marvin to
fill the recognized void. Mr. Hewitt contended that this concession by the
appellant was itself supportive of his position. Brief for Appellant at 3,
Brief for Appellee at 2, Hewitt v. Hewitt, 62 Ill. App. 3d 861, 380 N.E.2d 454
(1978).
66. Mr. Hewitt had attempted to distinguish Marvin. He claimed that
Marvin's discussion of relief not based on an express contract was mere
dictum. He also pointed out that while the Marvin's express contract involved the requisite bilateral promises, Mrs. Hewitt had not promised anything. Brief for Appellee at 7, Hewitt v. Hewitt, 62 Ill. App. 3d 861, 380 N.E.2d
454 (1978). The only distinguishing factor even mentioned in Hewitt was
the fact that the Marvin appellee had been married to another during the
first few years of his cohabitation with the appellant. The overall facts were
still held to be clearly comparable. 62 Ill. App. 3d at 865, 380 N.E.2d at 458
(1978).
67. Id. at 866, 380 N.E.2d at 458 (1978). In Illinois, attempting to sever
valid from illegal consideration has resulted in conflicting judicial positions.
Compare Hagen v. MacVeagh, 288 Ill. App. 1, 5 N.E.2d 577 (1936) (severing
forbearance to sue on a legal claim from illicit conduct between the contracting parties) with Frederick v. Frederick, 44 Ill. App. 3d 578, 358 N.E.2d
398 (1976) (antenuptial agreement held totally unenforceable where single
clause granted unexercisable power of appointment for purpose of escaping
federal estate tax assessment).
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policy contentions having been dispelled, the court moved to review other theories advanced on his behalf.
The assertion that Mrs. Hewitt's improper conduct should
be punished by leaving her without a remedy was answered by
reference to Marvin's dispensation of a similar argument. Calling attention to the fact that appellee was equally guilty, and
a
that punishing one of two guilty parties rewards the other,
68
pure guilt basis for denial of relief was not given effect.
Mr. Hewitt's argument that his former cohabitant should be
69
denied recourse to equity by the doctrine of "unclean hands"
was dispelled by quoting from a concurring opinion in West v.
Knowles.70 In West, Justice Finley suggested that when courts
disassociate themselves from matters involving non-marital relationship termination, they create binding law allowing the
party in possession of or having sole title to property, at the end
of the meretricious relationship, to cunningly retain the entire
benefit of the parties' joint labors. 71 The Hewitt court took cognizance of this possible unfairness, and refused to be bound by
such a hands-off policy.7 2 With the last of appellee's policy defenses disposed of, appellant was held to have stated a cause of
action in express contract. 73 The court also observed that no
public policy precluded other forms of relief from being
68. See 62 Ill. App. 3d at 866-7, 380 N.E.2d at 459 (1978).

69. Since it is assumed that both parties were necessary components
for any immoral relation here, it appears that appellee's reliance rested on
an "unclean hands" corollary, "equity will not aid a wrongdoer against another in equal fault."
70. 50 Wash. 2d 311, 311 P.2d 689 (1957). The state of Washington has a
developed body of case law on meretricious claims. In Creasman v. Boyle,

31 Wash. 2d 345, 196 P.2d 835 (1948), a rule was set down that in the absence

of a trust relation, property acquired during a meretricious relationship be-

longed to the person who held title. In West, this rule was limited to a presumption arising when there was no evidence of intention ascertainable
from the circumstances. This presumption still has not been overruled.
See Hinkle v. McColm, 89 Wash. 2d 769, 575 P.2d 711 (1978). Its effect, however, has been limited by recent decisions. See notes 42 and 44 supra. See
generally 48 WASH. L. REV. 635 (1973).
71. 50 Wash. 2d 311, 316, 311 P.2d 689, 692-3 (1957) (Finley, J., concur-

ring).

72. See 62 111. App. 3d at 867, 380 N.E.2d at 459 (1978). Hewitt fits into this
state's "unclean hands" trend. Illinois courts have said this defense is not
to be favored. E.g., Bonner v. Westbound Records, 49 Ill. App. 3d 543, 364

N.E.2d 570 (1977). Evidencing the state's disinterest in "unclean hands" defenses, the state legislature abolished the divorce defense of recrimination.
See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, § 403(c) (1977). This defense had precluded the
divorce of parties who had each been guilty of marital misconduct or fault
grounds of equal stature. See, e.g., Mogged v. Mogged, 55 Ill. 2d 221, 302
N.E.2d 293 (1973) (reversed lower court decree granting both parties a dimental cruelty).
vorce
73. for
62 IMI.App. 3d at 867, 380 N.E.2d at 459 (1978).
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granted. 74 An examination of the basis for other possible remedies was undertaken.
The court, realizing that it needed to look no further than
Marvin for persuasive arguments, adopted its rationale that unmarried cohabitants do have expectations arising from their relationship and judicial barriers blocking the way of their
fulfillment must be removed. 75 In concluding that the Marvin
reasoning was sound, even though partially dicta, appellant was
held to have stated causes of action in implied contract, implied
partnership or joint venture, resulting and constructive trust,
76
and quantum meruit.
Discussing the ramifications of its holding, the court denied
that it had judicially revived a form of the legislatively abolished
common law marriage.7 7 The court also believed that the marriage institution had not been denigrated by its opinion, as it
was noted that the appellee's theory would, in most cases, provide encouragement to the wealthy or potentially wealthy to
avoid marriage so as to retain all property and earnings at the
78
expense of his or her mate.
SQUARING ILLINOIS LAW WITH THE TREND TOWARD

MERETRICIOUS JUSTICE

Hewitt's predecessors had injected uncertainties into this
developing area of the law. Even the vocabulary of non-marital
cohabitation has perplexed the courts, and the Hewitt court was
no exception. The court, in using laymen's dictionary definitions indicating that "meretricious" refers to prostitution, 79 correctly pointed out that, in this sense, appellee's reference to
Mrs. Hewitt as a meretricious spouse was without merit. The
phrases "meretricious relationship" and "meretricious spouse"
have recently been employed, however, in a broader sense as
74. Id. While the trial court limited its memorandum dismissal to theo-

ries of implied contract, joint venture, and partnership, appellant's brief
suggested causes of action in express contract, resulting and constructive
trusts, and quantum meruit. The appellate court in Hewitt assumed that
the trial court ruling on these other counts would have been the same. See
id. at 863, 380 N.E.2d at 456.
75. The court defined such expectations by saying "[tjhe parties may
well expect that property will be divided in accord with the parties' own
tacit understanding and that in the absence of such understanding, the
courts will fairly apportion property accumulated through mutual effort."
Id. at 868, 380 N.E.2d at 460.
76. Id. See notes 42-45 supra.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 868-9, 380 N.E.2d at 460.
79. The word "meretricious" was derived from the Latin verb, merere,
meaning: to earn pay. THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 821 (1976).
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merely descriptive of the relationship, and the parties, where
they know they are living together without being married. 80 The
Hewitt court refused to adopt this modern meaning of "meretricious." Since agreements resting on "meretricious sexual services" are unenforceable, it was apparently feared that describing
Mrs. Hewitt as a meretricious spouse was incompatible with
granting her a cause of action in express contract. Reference to
appellant as a meretricious spouse would not have undermined
the court's holding. It is not the presence of a modern meretricious relationship nor the reference to one as a meretricious
spouse that prevents recovery. 8 1 Rather it is the finding that
prostitution-like meretricious sexual services formed the cohabitation basis; and there appears to be a well-delineated difference between prostitution and living together for mutual
benefit. 82 While this preliminary misconception by the court,
upon analysis, actually serves to explain the new meretricious
claim rule, other portions of the opinion fare poorly in an attempt to set forth a state policy for non-marital relationships.
This failure is the direct result of the court's unwillingness to
focus on the major themes of the appellate arguments, most notably appellee's public policy contentions.
Three distinct public policy notions were involved in Hewitt.
The court concentrated on but two of them, never dealing with
the essence of the third, which was the gist of appellee's argument. One discussion dealt with whether non-marital cohabitation, with its presumed attendant immoral sexual intercourse,
renders the agreements of unmarrieds unenforceable for want
of legal contract consideration. Limiting invalidity of consideration to the promise or performance of services as a paramour, in
actuality, should render future discussions of this nature irrelevant in situations where the parties promised to perform the
same duties normally associated with married life. Even where
anticipated sexual conduct forms part of the reason for the co80. See, e.g., Carlson v. Olson, 256 N.W.2d 249, 252 n.2 (Minn. 1977);
Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd. v. Worley, 23 Pa. Commw. Ct. 357,
358, 352 A.2d 240, 241 (1976) (rejected woman's theory that "meretricious" is
descriptive only of parties holding themselves out as married, holding that
the term includes situations where a man and woman live together with or
without pretense of marriage); Coolidge, Rights of the Putative and Meretricious Spouse in California, 50 CALIF. L. REV. 866, 873 (1962); 48 WASH. L.
REV. 635 (1973) (the state of Washington has often used the term meretricious as synonymous with non-marital). The modifier "spouse" following
"meretricious" seems to evidence the basis of this modern definition, as
something entirely different from prostitution.
81. See, e.g., Omer v. Omer, 11 Wash. App. 386, 523 P.2d 957 (1974).

82. See Marvin v. Marvin, 18 Cal. 3d 660, 684, 557 P.2d 106, 122, 134 Cal.
Rptr. 815, 831 (1976) (emphasis added).
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habitation, valid domestic services can support the contract of
cohabitation.
The inquiry into whether Mrs. Hewitt's conduct offended
state public policy was limited to the criminal and marriage statutes. With respect to the criminal fornication statute, it is apparent that no such offense was ascertainable from the
pleadings, at least if the "open and notorious" language is interpretted as in People v. Cessna.8 3 The Committee Comments,
however, report the intention to proscribe conduct adverse to
key interests sought to be protected, and list among those interests "the protection of the marriage institution from sexual con'84
duct which tends to destroy it."
Those advocating that nonmarital cohabitation is itself destructive of the marital institution could argue that appellant's conduct, though not criminally
punishable, was violative of the state public policy as evidenced
by the legislature's comments. The court, however, after setting
out these committee comments, failed to deal with this possible
interpretation. With neither of the Hewitts having been married
to another person during their cohabitation, the opinion could
have been strengthened by interpreting the sexual conduct
tending to the destruction of the marriage institution as contemplating the offense of adultery, where at least one offender has a
living legal spouse.
The court, without expressly meeting appellant's contention
that the new Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act
was irrelevant in discussions of unmarried persons, 8 5 impliedly
rejected this argument by frequently analyzing various provisions. While the Hewitt court quoted extensively from Marvin,
it bypassed one of its more important premises. Marvin, confronted with lower court opinions awarding meretricious
spouses relief according to community property principles of
statutory marriage legislation, 86 rejected theories that such acts
were at all applicable, and concluded that the rights of unmarried persons are to be fixed entirely by judicial decision. 87 This
83. 42 Ill. App. 3d 746, 356 N.E.2d 621 (1976). See note 64 supra.
84. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 11-1 et seq. (Smith-Hurd 1972).
85. The new Act could not be seriously questioned in a chronological
sense. Appellant's original complaint had been filed and dismissed prior to
the October 1, 1977 effective date of the Act. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, § 801(b)
states, however, that "[t] his act applies to all pending actions and proceedings commenced prior to its effective date with respect to issues on which a
judgment has not been entered." The trial court judgment on this amended

count was rendered in 1978.
86. See, e.g., In re Cary, 34 Cal. App. 3d 345, 109 Cal. Rptr. 862 (1973)
(construing CAL. CiV. CODE §§ 4000 et seq. (West 1970)).
87. Marvin v. Marvin, 18 Cal. 3d 660, 683, 557 P.2d 106, 120, 134 Cal. Rptr.
815, 829 (1976).
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rationale could have been used by the Hewitt court if it wished
to exclude examination of the Illinois Marriage Act from adjudications of non-marital rights. The court, however, believed it
was necessary to study the Act as one setting forth the state's
domestic public policy. While it was appellant's contention that
was dispelled, the adverse effect fell upon appellee, as the
court's central examination of the marriage statutes was misdirected.
When the court dealt with public policy in terms of illegality
of consideration and appellant's conduct, it focused its attention
on whether illicit cohabitation was in and of itself, against public
policy. This is evidenced by the fact that the court's primary
emphasis in scrutinizing the marriage statutes dealt with
whether non-marital cohabitation was in some way prohibited.
The inquiry should have been directed to whether the granting
to unmarrieds, of state protection over contract and property
rights, was within the purview of the legislative restructuring of
Illinois family law. Indeed appellee's public policy based rebuttal had centered on the assumption that the legislature's refusal
to provide guidelines for the problems of unmarried cohabitation, during the 1977 overhaul of Illinois' domestic relations law,
indicated the state's choice to limit recognition of relationships
to those based on legal or putative marriages. The fact that the
well-publicized Marvin opinion had been rendered during the
deliberations seems to buttress this position. It is one thing to
say that one's agreements and conduct are not violative of public policy. It is another to hold that public policy recognizes a
type of relationship and the conferring of rights upon participants. This is especially true in Illinois, where the state retains
a strong interest in marriage to the extent that it is considered a
partner in a three party marital relationship.8 8
While the Illinois statutes take no position expressly dealing with meretricious relationships, close scrutinization and realistic interpretation reveal the state's disapproval of the
conferring of rights upon unmarried cohabitants. The refusal to
recognize common law marriages could be construed as rejecting the contended existence of the meretricious relationship
and corresponding rights, where such relationship appears to be
an attempt to enter into a common law marriage. The Hewitt
88. Johnson v. Johnson, 381 Ill. 362, 366, 45 N.E.2d 625, 627 (1943). While
concepts of marital misconduct have been eliminated from property divi-

sion and maintenance claim determinations, Illinois has refused to adopt a
no-fault divorce doctrine. This retention of fault grounds and the sanctions
against collusive obtainment of divorce suggest the great willingness of the
legislature to preserve the marital institution. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40,
§§ 401-504 (1977).
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facts suggest such an attempt. When appellant became pregnant, appellee thereupon suggested that the parties were married. Their agreement to enter into a matrimonial relationship
through assumption of marital duties would have met one underlying prerequisite for a common law marriage. 89 The other
element, cohabitation between the parties, could not be seriously contested.
With the foregoing in mind, the most troublesome merger of
thoughts in this opinion is the court's conclusion that it has not
judicially revived the legislatively abolished common law marriage. This suggestion may be seriously doubted when it is attempted to be squared with the court's view that Mrs. Hewitt
lived within the legitimate boundariesof a marriage.90 To add
to this confusion, the court, after saying that the parties had
lived within the boundaries of a marriage, met appellee's punishment defense remarks by referring to the Hewitts as equally
guilty persons.9 1 This backed the court into a corner. The "legitimate boundaries" premise was apparently needed to support
the development of meretricious relief, yet the court could not
say the parties were free from legal or moral guilt for fear of
having the opinion branded as that of three men trying to impose their sense of moral values on the people at large.
In arguing that state disapproval of granting rights to meretricious spouses is implicit in the Illinois statutory scheme, an
interpretation of the putative spouse doctrine 92 lends credence
to this theory. Good faith believers in the validity of their invalid marriages are extended rights up to the time of their knowledge of the marital invalidity. Once notice of a defect is received
and the party has imputed to him the realization that he is cohabiting illicitly, no rights accrue. It can be contended that the
rights cut off by receipt of knowledge are those vis-a-vis a legal
spouse, and that knowledge would not prevent the derivation of
meretricious rights. The argument could be made, however,
that such provision evidences an intent to extend state protec89. See note 10 supra.
90. 62 Ill. App. 3d at 864, 380 N.E.2d at 457 (1978) (emphasis added).
91. Id. at 866-7, 380 N.E.2d at 459.
92. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, § 305 (1977). See note 3 supra. Contrary to
other states in which solemnization is sufficient, an actual marriage ceremony is an essential element of the Illinois putative spouse definition. A
marriage can be solemnized before witnesses without actual ceremony.
Bowman v. Bowman, 24 Ill. App. 165, 172 (1888). To solemnize a marriage

means no more than to enter into a marriage contract before third persons
for the purpose of giving it notoriety and certainty. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1564 (revised 4th ed. 1968). A ceremony appears unnecessary for a legal
Illinois marriage, as a marriage is valid if it is licensed, solemnized, and registered as statutorily provided. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, § 201 (1977).
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tion, of whatever variety, only to the limits of good faith belief in
moral cohabitation. Unfortunately, the court completely bypassed this discussion. This failure, when coupled with the
court's refusal to counter appellee's argument that the Marriage
Act, as a whole, evidenced an intent not to reward meretricious
spouses, shows the opinion's focus, on whether non-marital cohabitation was prohibited, was clearly misdirected. The court
would have benefited from deciding that the Marriage Act was
inapplicable to this case, and following Marvin, adjudicated the
parties' rights solely by judicial decision.
The conspicuous absence of discussion on other recent meretricious claim cases, such as Carlson v. Olson,93 is troubling.
Carlson, a Minnesota decision, could have been used to show
that Marvin is not merely an outgrowth of California's liberal
interpretation of the morality of non-marital cohabitation. The
total reliance on Marvin as precedent is regrettable, because it
leaves the opinion susceptible to criticisms based on certain differences between the family law of California and Illinois.
Marvin dealt with a pure community property system, with
each legal spouse acquiring a one-half interest in property accumulated during marriage. In Illinois, separate property concepts prevail up to the time of marriage dissolution. 94 It appears
to be a greater step to award title to a meretricious spouse
where separate title concepts are so strongly rooted, as compared to where notions of equality of interest are paramount to
title.
Both Marvin and Hewitt recognized state policy promotive
of marriage. A greater pro-marriage public policy is evidenced,
however, where stringent grounds for divorce are required in
contradistinction to the presence of no-fault doctrines facilitating dissolutions. While California has adopted a degree of nofault, Illinois is one of only three jurisdictions restricting disso93. 256 N.W.2d 249 (Minn. 1977). One possible explanation for the
Hewitt court's refusal to discuss the case is that the Carlsonholding spoke,
not in a contractual sense, but in terms of an implied irrevocable gift, a theory not advanced by Mrs. Hewitt. Appellee had pointed out this distinction.
Brief for Appellee at 7, Hewitt v. Hewitt, 62 Ill. App. 3d 861, 380 N.E.2d 454
(1978).

94. Illinois recognizes no rights of a spouse in the other's separate property during marriage. Title irrelevancy and the presumption that property

acquired during marriage is "marital property" arises upon dissolution
only. Even then "marital property" is not divided one-half to each spouse,
as in community property states. Instead, division is made after consideration of all ten listed relevant factors. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, § 503 (1977). See
generally Auerbach, Introduction To The New Illinois Marriageand Dissolution of MarriageAct, 66 ILL. B.J. 132 (1977); Heyman, The Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of MarriageAct. New Solutions to Old Problems, 12 J.
MAR. J. 1 (1978).
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lutions to proven marital fault. 95 This also exemplifies Illinois'
reluctance to follow the family law leads of other states, as was
done in Hewitt.
Exemplifying California's pre-Marvin non-marital liberalism, putative spouses were allowed implied partnership and
quantum meruit remedies, and cases suggested there was no
difference in putative and meretricious rights.9 6 Illinois' stricter
view is shown by limitation of putative rights to property division and possible maintenance, without quantum meruit allowance, during good faith belief in moral cohabitation. From the
foregoing, Hewitt appears to have usurped a much greater barrier than was faced by the Marvin court.
While the court adopted Marvin wholeheartedly, it is unfortunate that attention was not directed to the warnings of the dissenting justice, who preferred a narrower decision which would
not attempt to solve the entire meretricious claim area without
considering the ramifications. 97 Instead, this court of first impression set out the Marvin laundry list of remedial devices, 98
without a word as to the effect of the merger of these out-of-state
developments with existing Illinois law. Had the court scrutinized present Illinois partnership law, 99 it is probable that the
inapplicability of the implied partnership remedy to Hewitt's
facts would have been apparent. Directions to this effect should
have accompanied the court's opinion. An essential partnership
feature, the carrying on of a business for profit, 10 0 was unascertainable from the pleaded facts. Granted the appellant had
worked for appellee's dentistry practice and received a
paycheck. The receipt of a portion of business profits, however,
is insufficient inference of a partnership when in the form of em95.

Compare CAL. Civ. CODE §§ 4506 et seq. (West 1977) with ILL. REV.
For a headcount of jurisdictions retaining fault

STAT. ch. 40, § 401 (1977).

grounds exclusively versus those adopting the various forms and degrees of
no-fault, reference should be made to Freed and Foster, Divorce In The Fifty
States: An Outline, 11 FAM. L. Q. 297, 300 (1977) (includes probable national
trends and local changes).
96. See, e.g., In re Cary, 34 Cal. App. 3d 345, 109 Cal. Rptr. 862 (1973). See
generally 12 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 436 (1974).
97. One question which would have been worth discussion is whether it
is equitable to impose the obligations of lawful spouses onto parties who
expressly rejected matrimony to avoid them. See Marvin v. Marvin, 18 Cal.
3d 660, 687, 557 P.2d 106, 123, 134 Cal. Rptr. 815, 832 (1976) (Clark, J., concurring and dissenting). This problem has led authors to suggest that future
cohabitants will draw up agreements expressly disaffirming certain rights
and obligations. See 90 HARv. L. REV. 1708, 1717 (1977); 23 WAYNE L. REV.
1305, 1317 (1977).

98. See notes 42-45 and accompanying text supra.
99. See generally ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 106-1/2 (1977).
100. Id. § 6(1); Teed v. Parsons, 202 Ill. 455, 458, 66 N.E. 1044, 1046 (1903).
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ployee wages.10 ' By allowing recovery in quantum meruit, the
court expands domestic relief in the face of "gratuitous domestic
services presumption" precedents denying recovery for the
value of rendered services. 10 2 If meretricious parties are to be
deemed as living in a family relationship for purposes of quasidivorce property divisions, there is no reason why they should
not be bound by a state policy presumption on rendering services within that family relationship.
By allowing Mrs. Hewitt various causes of action, the opinion is subject to a criticism leveled at Marvin by its dissenter.
Failing to heed Justice Clark's warning, the Hewitt court's list of
remedies is not explained in terms of when they may or may not
be used. It is conceivable under Marvin and Hewitt that a
cohabitor could receive one-half of the property on a contract
theory, demand a bonus in expectation-based remedies, and sue
for the value of services in quantum meruit. 10 3 By failing to
enunciate concrete remedial guidelines, the court opens dangerous pitfalls for the unwary.
HEWITT'S EFFECT ON ILLINOIS MARRIAGE AND THE FUTURE OF

NON-MARITAL FAMILY LAW

Non-marital causes of action having been stated, reflections
upon the impact of Hewitt on the marital institution must necessarily follow. That the institution has fallen on hard times recently has been statistically documented and theoretically
explained. 10 4 In Illinois, no plausible claim could be advanced
that judicial rewarding of non-marital cohabitation has taken its
toll on marriage. Hewitt is the preliminary appellate opinion
101. ILL.

REV. STAT.

ch. 106-1/2, § 7(4) (b) (1977); Schumann-Heink v. Fol-

som, 328 Ill. 321, 324, 159 N.E. 250, 252 (1928). Even in Washington, the state
of its development, the implied partnership appears unemployable as a
meretricious remedy, absent a true business venture between the parties.
See Omer v. Omer, 11 Wash. App. 386, 389, 523 P.2d 957, 960 (1974) (dicta); 48
WASH. L. REV. 635, 640 (1973).
102. In order to recover in quantum meruit, a plaintiff must show that he
rendered services with the expectation of monetary return. In Illinois, how-

ever, a presumption that services are rendered gratuitously among family
members can be overcome only by proof of an express or implied-in-fact
contract. Dempski v. Dempski, 27 Ill. 2d 69, 72, 187 N.E.2d 734, 736 (1963).

The family relationship giving rise to this presumption need not be based
on blood or affinity. In re White's Estate, 15 Ill. App. 3d 200, 203, 303 N.E.2d
569, 570 (1973). A meretricious family conceivably would be within the
scope of the White rationale. See In re Estate of Thompson, 337 Ill. App. 290,
85 N.E.2d 840 (1949) (failure of meretricious type claim for services rendered was based on absence of contract rather than on a public policy
against non-marital cohabitation).
103. See Marvin v. Marvin, 18 Cal. 3d 660, 687, 557 P.2d 106, 123, 134 Cal.
Rptr. 815, 832 (1976) (Clark, J., concurring and dissenting).

104. See note 5 supra.
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recognizing such "fruits of cohabitation." Instead, the commentators have explained the trend away from marriage as
grounded in the implied rewards of not being subjected to prejudicial statutory enactments and the overall inflexibility and
1 05
finalness of marriage.
It is highly doubtful that this decision alone will have so
marked an effect as to lead to a "meretricious marriage" boom at
the expense of legal marriage. Actually, for every person who
would consciously enter non-marital cohabitation solely because dissolution rights now attach, there should be another,
whose previous intention to cohabit without financial obligation,
being frustrated, leaves no reason for avoiding marriage, save
the aforementioned statutory, inflexibility, and finalness
problems. The foregoing anomaly suggests that the most noticeable change occasioned by Hewitt is that a different class of persons will now be most apt to avoid marriage. Prior to this case,
the wealthy had the best reason for not marrying. Now the
party wishing to "cohabit into money" can best justify non-marriage. From a property standpoint, it appears that the Hewitt
non-marital policy is neither more nor less destructive or promotive of marriage than prior hands-off positions. This case,
however, may be hailed in the future as laying the groundwork
upon which a more perfect marital institution could be built. By
pointing out the real causes of dissatisfaction with marriage, the
court impliedly invited the legislature to encourage marriage by
affirmatively strengthening the institution rather than negatively punishing those with different cohabitation preferences.
Based on a sense of justice and equity, quasi-divorce relief
may now be afforded a deprived meretricious spouse in Illinois.
Competing theories should clash in the immediate future. Some
will advocate complete equal protection for the meretricious
spouse vis-a-vis legal spouses. 10 6 Rights to intestate and elec105. Id. See Hewitt v. Hewitt, 62 Ill. App. 3d 861, 869, 380 N.E.2d 454, 460
(1978).

106. The United States Supreme Court has acted in this general area.
See, e.g., Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (statute prohibiting contraceptive use except by marrieds held violative of equal protection clause).
Briefly stated, the equal protection argument contends that the structuring

of one's own home life as he desires is a fundamental right requiring strict
equal protection scrutiny and a compelling state interest to usurp it. The
basis for this position is that the family unit, and not marriage, is the backbone of society, and that continued legal distinctions based on marital status further neither marriage nor the family unit. See Mitchelson and
Glucksman, Equal ProtectionFor UnmarriedCohabitors.An Insider'sLook
at Marvin v. Marvin, 5 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 283 (1978).

Two courts have not opted for strict scrutiny in upholding state laws
against equal protection challenges by meretricious spouses. See Vogel v.
Pan Am. World Airways, 450 F. Supp. 224 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (California's
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tive shares of decedents' estates, standing to sue for wrongful
death, and ability to receive various government benefits are

only a few of the possible areas where these equal protection
arguments may be employed. 10 7 Contentions that dependency
rather than morality should be the determinative standard have
already been successful.10 8 Others will seize this "non-marital"
rights doctrine, attempting to extend its rationale to multiple
party and homosexual living arrangements. 10 9
Many will point to Hewitt as granting flexibility and rights
superior to those of legal spouses. Greater freedom to contract
is evidenced by the enforceability of oral non-marital contracts
in contradistinction to the strict writing requirements for antenuptial agreements. 110 This double standard can be remedied
by including agreements of meretricious spouses within the
Statute of Frauds. 1 ' Promoters of marital flexibility, however,
will raise doubts as to the need for written antenuptial promises.
It will also be pointed out that the type and possible cumulation
of Hewitt remedies financially rewards meretricious spouses to
a greater extent than legal spouses upon dissolution of marwrongful death statute, CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 337 (West 1977), found rationally based in terms of fostering marriage and preventing possible fraudulent meretricious claims); Matter of Lacey, 34 Or. App. 877, 580 P.2d 1032
(1978) (workmen's compensation statute found to rationally distinguish be-

tween childless unmarried couples excluded from coverage and married
couples and unmarried cohabitants with dependent children whose losses
are compensible).
107. Interesting arguments can be made wherever statutes use the terms
"husband", "wife", or "spouse." See, e.g., ILL.REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 11-1 (1977)
(excepting "wife" from class of possible rape victims). Doubts may be
raised as to the constitutionality of fornication statutes. See generally Brodie, Privacy: The Family and the State, 1972 U. ILL. L. F. 743 (1972); Annot.,

41 A.L.R.3d 1338 (1972).
108. See, e.g., West v. Barton-Malow Co., 394 Mich. 334, 230 N.W. 2d 545
(1975) (woman held to be an eligible dependent for workmen's compensation benefits upon death of man she cohabited with for thirteen years).
109. See generally Comment, The Legality of Homosexual Marriage,82
YALE L. J. 573 (1973); 30 OKLA. L. REV. 494, 497 (1977).
110. An oral antenuptial agreement is void under the statute of frauds.
E.g., Lee v. Central National Bank and Trust Co. of Rockford, 26 Ill. App. 3d
394, 397, 308 N.E.2d 605, 607 (1974) (construing ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 59, § 1
(1977)).
111. On February 21, 1979, House Bill 507 was introduced in the Illinois

General Assembly for the purpose of amending the Statute of Frauds, ILL.
ch' 59 (1977). The proposed legislation, in pertinent part provides that "[wIhere one party seeks recovery against another based solely
REV. STAT.

upon the relationship of the two persons while living together as partners
when not married to each other or based upon services performed as a consequence of such a relationship, there can be no recovery under any theory
of law, including but not limited to [listing remedial theories recognized in
Hewitt], unless there is a legal written contract between the parties specifying the obligations and expectations of the parties based on the relationship." The prohibition applies whether the services relied on are sexual,

family-like, or designed to advance business efforts.
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riage. 112 More importantly, many will wonder about basing the
new meretricious relief doctrine on the "expectations of the parties." In some cases of non-marital cohabitation, the breadwinner's expectations may be to cohabit without financial
obligation. It is difficult to see how imposing the obligations of a
lawful spouse onto one whose expectations were to cohabit
without marital responsibility can be justified on a theory that,
as one of the parties, his or her expectations are to be taken into
consideration.
CONCLUSION

The problems of meretricious relationships, dormant so
long in Illinois, can be taken lightly no longer. Indeed, in probably the single most important phrase of the Hewitt opinion, the
court warned that "the courts should be prepared to deal realistically and fairly with the problems which exist in the life of the
day." 113 Extension of this warning to the Illinois legislature is
the next logical step. The fact that this opinion was rendered by
an intermediate appellate court, with an appeal still pending,
naturally delimits Hewitt's overall impact. 114 For the present,
however, Hewitt is the law of meretricious claims for Illinois. In
its positional and precedential perspectives, the case appears to
be another small step toward national recognition of the meretricious relationship as at least a quasi-legal one, 115 that requires not only judicial intervention on behalf of injured
litigants, but also the expansion of legislative efforts designed to
deal with the contentions certain to be raised in the future.
Jeffrey A. Ryva

112. While the Hewitt remedies are conceivably cumulative, in Illinois,
maintenance upon dissolution is conditioned upon the lack of sufficient

property apportioned to a spouse and the inability to supplement that
amount through employment or other means. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, § 504
(1977). Homemaker's services are considered in dissolution proceedings,
but only'to the extent of divisions of "marital property." See id. § 503. A
former statute prevented wives and husbands from recovering compensation for services. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 68, § 8 (1975). This statute has been
repealed by the new domestic relations act, yet it is doubtful that legal
spouses are now allowed a suit in quantum meruit. The judicial presumption that domestic services are rendered gratuitously between family members, while possibly limited by Hewitt, remains in effect as to legal spouses.
See note 102 supra.
113. 62 Ill. App. 3d at 869, 380 N.E.2d at 460 (1978).
114. Hewitt v. Hewitt, No. 51264 (Ill. filed Oct. 6, 1978). Oral arguments
are scheduled for May, 1979.
115. Statistics indicate that there is a growing tendency of state courts to
cite sister state family law decisions. See [19761 3 FAM. L. REP. (BNA)

2066 (Interstate Citation Survey).

